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Notes
THE APPLICABILITY OF EXPERIENCE RATING
TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
The medical malpracticecrisis has continued to exact significant costsfrom the
medical community. In an effort to solve the problem of decreasingavailability of
affordable insurancefor the practitioner,two states have introduced merit-based rating ofphysicians. This Note analyzes the New York and Massachusettsplansof experience rating and concludes that the subjectivity which is incorporated into the
MLMIC of New York plan is more desirable, especiallyfrom the standpoint of the
physician.
INTRODUCTION

The current upheaval in the area of medical malpractice has inspired demands for change and a vast array of proposed solutions
from physicians, attorneys, insurers and legislators. Concerns over
rising costs and their concomitant effect on the quality of health
care have motivated many of the changes. The debate continues,1
and as of yet, no panacea has been found to remedy this "crisis."
Solutions range from a panoply of state-enacted tort reforms2 to
suggestions for improved physician monitoring and penalization of
1. The term "crisis" in the area of medical malpractice insurance seems to encompass
various interpretations depending on one's frame of reference (insurer, physician, or lawyer,
etc.). For example, "the term 'crisis' denotes a crucial, unstable condition in which abrupt,
drastic change is impending." AM. BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LiAB., REPORT TO THE HousE OF DELEGATES, commentary at 29 (Feb. 11, 1986)
[hereinafter ABA COMM.] (the committee felt the term was inappropriate with respect to the
medical malpractice insurance situation). Furthermore, a "crisis" in the medical malpractice
context has specifically referred either to problems of "availability," "affordability" or both.
See AM. MEDICAL ASS'N SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIoNAL LIAB. AND INSuRANCE,
PROFESSIONAL LIABLrrY IN THE 80's, REPORT 1 at 4-11 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter AMA
TASK FORCE, REPORT 1]; Posner, Trends in Medical MalpracticeInsurance, 1970-1985, 49
LAW & CNTEMP. PROBS. 37, 38, 49-52 (1986); Hearings Before the Wisconsin Legislature
Joint Comm. on MedicalMalpractice (Feb. 26, 1986) (testimony of Dr. Claude C. Lilly, Director of the Center for Insurance Research at Florida State University); See also P.
DANzoN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:

THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985)

(comprehensive discussion of causes and cures for availability and affordability problems in
medical malpractice insurance).
2. See generally Essen & Aldred, The American MedicalAssociation vs. the American
Tort System, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 241 (1986) (discussion of damage caps, restrictions on
attorney contingency fees, elimination of the collateral source rule, and payment of damages
by installment); Rust, 23 States OK'd Reforms in '86, AM. MEDICAL NEws, July 25, 1986, at
1, col. 1.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:255

negligent practitioners via the appropriate disciplinary mechanisms
of groups such as state licensing boards and hospital peer review
groups.

3

A suggestion which seems to be derived from the latter notions
of punishment and deterrence 4 is the application of experience or
merit rating5 to medical malpractice insurance as it has been used in
the automobile insurance industry.6 This approach would impose
higher malpractice insurance premiums on physicians with poor
track records during the previous insurance term, and rewards in
the form of premium reductions to those with no incidence of negligence.7 This Note will first examine the medical malpractice insurance industry's current state of affairs and then delve into its system
of classifying physicians for premium determination. It will then
introduce an alternate method of premium determination based on
experience rating and set forth two states' recent efforts at experience rating: the New York and Massachusetts plans. The final section will analyze these plans in light of possible benefits and
potential concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
The current state of alarm in the area of medical malpractice is
not unprecedented. 8 In the mid-1970s, physician malpractice insurance premiums soared, with some carriers implementing increases
as high as 500 percent. 9 Other insurers elected to withhold coverage or to abandon the malpractice segment of the market altogether, thereby making coverage for some physicians impossible to
secure at any price.10 The apparent cause of the 1970's crisis was a
sharp rise in costs per claim between 1969 and 1974 as the result of
3. See S. Wolfe, H. Bergman & G. Silver, Medical Malpractice: The Need for Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform i, iii, 4, 5 (Aug. 27, 1985) (unpublished report printed by the
Public Citizen Health Research Group) (advocates discipline of incompetent practitioners as
the solution to the crisis in medical malpractice insurance); Hinz, MD License Revocations up
34% in '85, Am. Medical News, Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1; cf AM. MEDICAL ASs'N SPECIAL
TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIAB. AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INTHE
'80's, REPORT 2 at 8, 10 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 2] (insurers
comment that criticism of physician discipline is unjustified).
4. See infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78 & note 165.
7. See generally sources cited infra note 158.
8. Posner, supra note 1, at 38.
9. Id.; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85.
10. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85; Posner, supra note 1, at 38; Steves, Medical Professional Liability, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY: IMPACT IN THE EIGHTIES 94 (1983).
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an increase in the "severity" and "frequency" of malpractice claims
during that time period. 1' A variety of theories have been propounded to explain why the insurance industry did not react sooner
to the changing climate of malpractice litigation in the early 1970s
and adjust premiums accordingly before such drastic measures became imperative in 1975.12
In response to the 1970s crisis, remedies focused on state tort
law reforms 3 and several fundamental changes within the insurance system. 14 Although exorbitant premiums were cause for concern among physicians, insurance "availability" problems posed an
even greater threat of disruption to the medical profession and to
health care delivery. 5 The abandonment of medical malpractice
coverage by insurers, creating the availability problem, has been
traced to state regulation or lack thereof. 6 As a result, many states
developed alternative mechanisms to fill the void created by the desertion of these commercial carriers.' 7 Joint underwriting associations (JUAs) were established in many states as a means of assuring
availability. 8 The JUA imposes a sort of compulsory compromise
on insurers. In order to engage in the sale of the more lucrative and
less risky forms of insurance, the carrier must agree to participate in
medical malpractice coverage as well.' 9
Another alternative was the birth of the physician-owned insur11. P. DANzON, supra note 1, at 98; M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 3 (1977); Posner, supra

note 1, at 38-39; Steves, A Proposalto Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationshipsin the Medical
Professional Liability Insurance System, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE DUKE LAW
JOURNAL SYMPOSISUM 143 (1977).
12. P. DANZON, supranote 1, at 99-103. "[Tihe most commonly cited factor was ignorance, allegedly resulting from lack of data and unanticipated changes... [plus] three other
possible contributing factors: federal price controls, state regulation, and competition." Id.
at 99.
13. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 11 (analysis of the constitutional ramifications
of the state revisions which were a response to the 1970s crisis).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-32.
15. See sources cited supra note 1 (regarding the "availability" crisis).
16. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 107-08. "Denial of requested rate increases or approval
of the claims-made form, or both, were directly responsible for the withdrawal of the group
carrier in [some states]." Id. at 108. For an explanation of claims-made policies see infra text
accompanying notes 23-32.
17. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 109.
18. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1 supra note 1, at 5; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85,
107, 111-12; Posner, supra note 1, at 41; Steves, supra note 10 at 94.
19. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85, 112. Although JUA's were not viewed as a long
term solution to the 1970s availability of insurance problem, they continue to exist. Id. at 85,
112, 113. In fact, last year, Virginia's JUA was revived after an independent carrier eliminated malpractice coverage. Liability Insurance: The Squeeze on MD.s Will Get Tighter,
MED. ECON., Nov. 10, 1986, at 197.
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ance company or "mutual. '2 1 In the seven years after the 1975 crisis, almost forty of these companies were created&' with the hope
that physician involvement would provide invaluable expertise and
understanding to the problems of medical malpractice insurance. 2
Finally, the crisis of the 1970s inspired the development of the
"claims-made" policy as an alternative to the previously prevalent
"occurrence" policy.2 3 The latter coverage protects the physician
from liability resulting from an episode of alleged malpractice
which occurs during the policy term, irrespective of when recovery
is ultimately sought.2 4 The claims-made policy, on the other hand,
insures against claims institutedduringthe policy term.2 5 This type
of policy provides some clear advantages in terms of predictability
for the insurer.26 Because of lengthy delays between an occurrence
and the ultimate resolution of a claim, which may take years, insurers using the occurrence form are confronted with the challenge of
predicting the economic implications of possible future claims.2 7
They must set premiums today which will cover the claims of tomorrow. By using the claims-made policy, the insurer seemingly
narrows this gap by covering claims rather than occurrences,
thereby eliminating much of the predictability problem. The resulting savings may then be passed on to the consumer in the form of
lower premiums.2z The claims-made policy, however, is not without its critics. Much of the criticism focuses on the vulnerability of
20. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 5; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 10910; Posner, supra note 1 at 39-40; Steves, supra note 10, at 94-95.
21. Posner, supra note 1, at 39 (citing AM. MED. ASSURANCE Co., 1985 USA DIRECTORY-PHYSCIAN-OWNED, MEDICAL SOCIETY-CREATED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES (9th ed. 1985)).
22. Id.; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 128-29.
23. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85, 91-92; Posner, supra note 1, at 44-45; Steves, supra
note 10, at 96-97.
24. Id. at 91-92, 110. Therefore, even if the physician is no longer currently insured by
the carrier, he is still covered for any claims arising from his activities during the time period
in which he was insured under that policy.
25. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 110; Posner, supra note 1, at 44; Steves, supra note 10,
at 97. According to Steves, a claims-made policy is triggered:
when a third party notifies an insured that redress for an injury is being sought.
The receipt of a call from a claimant or a letter or summons from the claimant's
legal representative is what is meant here in the strictest sense. However, . . .
[f]requently, what is defined as claims-made includes any incident reported to the
insurer within the policy period irrespective of whether a third party is involved.
Id.
26. Posner, supra note 1, at 44-45; Steves, supra note 10, at 98.
27. Posner, supra note 1, at 45.
28. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 111; cf. Steves, supra note 10, at 98 (cost advantages of
claims-made coverage are not well documented).
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the insured.2 9 As opposed to an occurrence policy where the in-

surer bears the brunt of the risk that the premiums of today will be
sufficient to pay the claims of tomorrow, with a claims-made policy,
the insured bears the risk that if costs rise today, so will his rates.
"By offering claims-made rather than occurrence insurance, the
company effectively transfers the risk of uncertainty concerning future price increases back to the insured, who is in a much less advantageous position to evaluate this uncertainty."3 ° In other words,
the impact on the physician's premiums of rising costs to the insurer becomes much more immediate and perhaps unanticipated.
The so-called transfer of uncertainty is in effect a transfer of the risk
of current malpractice cost increases. Furthermore, the physician
who terminates a claims-made policy must often make special provisions for coverage of claims filed after the policy's termination
date.3 ' These "tail" coverage policies are generally available at an
additional premium from the claims-made insurer, however situations vary.32
Despite the remedial measures inspired by the last crisis, there
again seems to be cause for concern. At the threshold of the current
debate is whether in fact another "affordability crisis' 33 exists today
in medical malpractice to justify the extensive mobilization of resources and implementation of reforms which have taken place.
While the answer to this question is a resounding "yes" from many
commentators, 34 others suggest that physicians are not
overburdened by malpractice premiums, but rather, they are paying
35
as they should for the serious losses they cause when negligent.
29. See Steves, supra note 10, at 101.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 97.
32. Should You Buy Tail Coverage?, MED. ECON., June 23, 1986, at 53. "[The cost of
the tail is usually 150 to 200 percent of the current annual premium. For many OBG's,
[obstetrician-gynecologists] that's a lump sum outlay of $40,000 to $50,000 or more .. " Id.
33. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 8, 10. Increases in liability premiums exceeding 80% over an eight year period have created a situation with which the president of the Physician Insurers Association of America sympathized. "'We need adequate

rates of coverage and sometimes are forced to collect obscene premiums that continue to
climb.'" Id.; ABA COMM. supranote 1, at 27 ("[The medical profession's primary focus [of

debate] is on affordability.") See Posner, supra note 1, at 37-38.
34. See Joint Commission on InsuranceHearingon MedicalMalpractice (Mar. 19, 1986)
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Barbara A. Rockett, M.D., President of the Massachusetts Medical Society before the Massachusetts Joint Commission on Insurance).
35. Sargeant, Blame Negligent Doctors, Not Insurance, Boston Globe, Apr. 3, 1985, at
15, col. 2; see also ABA COMM., supra note 1, commentary at 27-29 (expressing the opinion
that tort law should not be blamed for the alleged problems in malpractice insurance and that
pervasive reforms are not the solution).
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Whether the current problems are perceived as a "new crisis" or
merely a continuation of the old, there has been a renewed clamoring for change. Based upon available data regarding the number of
malpractice claims being filed against physicians, 36 the size of
awards,37 and the escalating cost of malpractice insurance,3 8 it is at
39
least arguable that the current uproar is not unfounded.
Before 1981, an annual average of 3.2 claims were brought per
100 physicians, and by 1985, the incidence had more than tripled to
an average of 10. 1.4 The figures for particular specialty areas are
even more striking. Before 1981, an annual average of 4.1 claims
were filed per 100 surgeons,4 1 while by 1985 the figure had risen to
16.5.42 For obstetrician/gynecologists the average annual claims
per 100 practitioners increased from 7.1, before 1981, to 26.6 by
1985. 4 ' Likewise, malpractice premiums continue to rise. In the
three years prior to 1985, there was an average yearly rate hike of
21.9 percent." Naturally, the extremes are well publicized. For
example, Long Island neurosurgeons are currently paying over
$83,000 per year for malpractice coverage. 5 Although many of the
recent reforms reflect the view that tort law is the source of these
problems, the insurance industry, along with its methods of risk
36. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
37. In 1980, the average award in a medical malpractice case was $404,726 with verdicts
ranging from $1,708 to approximately $6.7 million. Telephone interview with Claudia C.
Richardson, Research Assistant for Jury Verdict Research, Inc. of Solon, Ohio (Mar. 11,
1987). In 1985, the average award had escalated to almost $1.2 million with awards ranging
from $5,000 to nearly $12.7 million. Id. In 1986, medical malpractice awards ranged from
$2,500 to $15,787,555 with an average award amounting to $1,478,028. Telephone interview
with Claudia C. Richardson, Research Assistant for Jury Verdict Research, Inc. of Solon,
Ohio (Feb. 2, 1988). Although "averages" may overdramatize the trend in malpractice
awards, the figures referred to by Jury Verdict Research as "midpoint verdicts" (half the
awards in a given year are greater than this amount and half are less) also reflect this rise. Id.
The "midpoint verdicts" for 1980, 1985, and 1986 were approximately $200,000, $400,000,
and $800,000, respectively. Id.
38. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
39. Cf Posner, supra note 1, at 47-48 (disputing the credibility and reliability of data
used to support claims of a crisis in malpractice insurance).
40. PROFESSIONAL LIAB. CLEARINGHOUSE, AM. MEDICAL ASS'N CENTER FOR
HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE (Dec. 1986) (monthly

newsletter discussing data collected during a 1986 survey conducted by the Am. Medical
Ass'n's Socioeconomic Monitoring System).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Meyer, StatesActive on Tort Reform Front: New York Physicians Unhappy with Tort
Reform Bills, AM. MED. NEws, July 11, 1986, at 39.
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classification and rate determination, must be critically analyzed for
its contribution to the problem.
II. THE CURRENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Insurance classification is a method of grouping insured parties
based on factors which theoretically ensure that members of the
same classification share similar risks.4 6 Premiums are then determined based on an averaging of the past statistical experience of the
classification group.4 7 It is this rate-making approach which pre-

dominates among carriers of medical malpractice insurance. For
example, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which provides malpractice insurance to approximately 20 percent of the nation's physicians," employs an eight-tier classification scheme
ranging from Class 1 physicians who perform no surgical, invasive,
or obstetrical procedures, to Class 8 neurosurgeons.4 9 While the
number of classification groups may vary among carriers, 50 the ba46. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairnessin Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REv.
403, 408 (1985); Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517,
517 (1983).
47. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 646-48 (1972).
48. Telephone interview with Patrick R. Hirigoyen, Senior Communications Specialist
for St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. of St. Paul, Minnesota (Mar. 6, 1987) (unofficial

estimate based on information available to The St. Paul Companies).
49. MEDICAL SERVS. Div., ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO., PHYSICIANS' AND
SURGEONS' UPDATE, AN ANNUAL REPORT FROM THE ST. PAUL 4 (July 1986).

Rating Class
1

2

Specialty Definition
Physicians-no surgery, no invasive-procedures, no obstetrical procedures

Physicians-minor surgery, minor invasive procedures, no obstetrical
procedures
3
Family or General Practice-including obstetrical procedures (excluding
caesarean sections) Urgent Care Physician-no surgery/Bronchoesophagology/Physicias-major invasive procedures/Surgery--colon and
rectal, endocrinology, gastoenterology [sic], geriatrics, neoplastic,
nephrology, ophthamology and urological
4
Family or General Practice-major surgery/Emergency Medicine-no
major surgery
5a
Anesthesiologist
5
Emergency Medicine- major surgery/Surgery-abdominal, general,
gynecology, hand, head and neck, laryngology, otology,
otorhinolaryngology, plastic, plastic-otorhinolaryngology and rhinology
6
Surgery-cardiac, cardiovascular, orthopedic, thoracic, traumatic and
vascular
7
Obstetrics/Obstetrics-Gynecology
8
Surgery-Neurological (including child)
Id. (Table reproduced in part).
50. For example, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co. of New York (MLMIC) uses
14 classifications. Medical Liab. Mutual Ins Co., Premium Rate Schedules for Physicians
and Surgeons Occurence & Claims Made Policy Forms (1986) (became effective July 1, 1986).
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sic methodology is the same. Generally, the greater the risk associated with the procedures performed by a specialty group, the higher
will be the group's rank and premium payments." However, the
premium will frequently be further adjusted based on the geographic region in which the physician practices.5 2 Therefore, in this
system, losses are distributed across a group whose members share
similar risks. Of course, perfect "homogeneity ' 5 3 within a class is
not completely possible since there must be enough class members
to generate valid statistical inferences.54
In determining classifications and their associated rates (premiums), insurance companies consider several objectives. "Rates
must be (1) adequate, (2) not unfairly discriminatory, [and] (3) not
excessive ... as a matter of law." 5 To be "adequate" a rate must
be sufficient to cover costs arising from claims, as well as offset related business expenditures of the carrier. 6 By ensuring that carriers remain solvent, the policyholder is protected.5 7 The second
requirement which precludes unfair discrimination refers to "premium differences that do not correspond to expected losses and average expenses or... expected average cost differences that are not
reflected in premium differences." 5 8 In this context, "similarly situated" physicians should be similarly charged. 9 Finally, rates assessed by insurers cannot be "excessive." 6 For example, the
insurer cannot make an exorbitant profit61 at the policyholder's expense, or charge rates based on insupportable projections.62
51. Anzinger v. O'Connor, 109 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552, 440 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (1982).
52. Telephone interview with Charles Pinkerton of Pinkerton Insurance Agency, Cleveland, Ohio (agent for The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.) (Jan. 2, 1987).
53. Abraham, supra note 46, at 417-19.
54. Id. at 417. This notion that the size of the classification group is relevant is derived
from the "law of large numbers" which implies that "[t]he greater the number of exposures,
the more nearly will the actual results obtained approach the probable result expected with
an infinite number of exposures." R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supranote 47, at 33; see also P.
Dr' zoN, supra note 1, at 89-90 (discussion of the inapplicability of these concepts to medical
malpractice insurance).
55. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 47, at 642; see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
56. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 47, at 642.
57. Id.
58. Williams, UnfairRate Discriminationin Property andLiabilityInsurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 212 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).

59. Bentley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 227 Ga. 708, 712, 182 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1971) (homeowner's insurance), cited with approval in Anzinger v. O'Connor, 109 Ill. App. 3d 550, 559,
440 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (1982) (medical malpractice insurance).
60. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 47, at 644.
61. Id.
62. See, eg., Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass. v. Commissioner
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These criteria are frequently dictated by state law and provide a
foundation for litigation in this area.6 3 In Anzinger v. O'Connor,' a
group of emergency room physicians filed suit against the Director
of the Illinois Department of Insurance alleging that their malpractice premiums were "unfairly discriminatory and excessive." 6 5 The
court agreed and held that because the classification of emergency
room physicians was not based on the same criteria used to classify
other physicians (i.e. procedures performed), the classification was
discriminatory.6 6 In addition, the court concluded that due to the
improper classification, the rates charged were excessive.67
While the current rate classification scheme seems to prevail for
reasons of efficiency68 and predictability6 9 for the insurer, and for
the benefits of risk-spreading for the insured,70 other approaches are
being studied and suggested. Among these proposals is the application of experience rating to medical malpractice insurance.
III.

EXPERIENCE RATING

Experience rating (or merit rating) bases insurance premiums on
an individual's actual performance over a period of time.7 1 There
are several approaches to experience rating such as charging a base
premium and then modifying it based on performance "during the
policy period." 72 Another method involves looking at73the insured's
past performance and determining rates accordingly.
Merit rating has been used frequently by the automobile insurance industry.7 4 Insurers assess surcharges to drivers with poor
records based on accidents and other infractions.7 5 Commentators
suggest, however, that "accidents" may be just that, and are thereof Ins.,

395 Mass. 43, -, 478 N.E.2d 936, 941, (1985) (requiring that premiums be actuarially sound).
63. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 767.18 (1977), construed in Anzinger, 109 Inl.
App. 3d at 557-60, 440 N.E.2d at 1020-22.
64. 109 I1. App. 3d 550, 440 N.E.2d 1014 (1982).
65. Id. at 553, 440 N.E.2d at 1017.
66. Id. at 559, 440 N.E.2d at 1021.
67. Id.
68. See generally Abraham, supra note 46 (analysis of efficiency motivations and justifications behind insurance classifications).
69. Id
70. Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1282, 1287 (1978).
71. R. MEmR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 47, at 648-50.
72. Id. at 650 (termed "retrospective rating").
73. Id. at 649-50 (termed "prospective experience rating").
74. See id. at 657.
75. Austin, supra note 46, at 564.
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fore neither deterrable nor indicative of future risks.76 In other
words, it will be of little value to penalize the policyholder in the
hope of avoiding conduct over which he/she has little, if any, control, and which says nothing about the driver's propensity for future
losses.7 7 The response to this criticism is to impose surcharges only
for fault-based "accidents. ' 78 The question then becomes, how one
defines "fault" for purposes of experience rating. It is this issue
which is fundamental to the applicability of experience rating to
medical malpractice insurance.
Theoretically, this approach could provide the best of all possible solutions by maintaining the cohesiveness of group classifications while superimposing the assets of individualization.7 9 Those
physicians who are causing the problems would be required to pay
for them through higher premiums. In a sense, experience rating
may be viewed as a supplement to other policing and disciplinary
mechanisms used to monitor and control medical malpractice
which have been frequently criticized as lax and ineffective80 (i.e.
medical review boards).
If experience rating were applied to medical malpractice insurance, physicians would be assessed surcharges for incidents of "negligence" during a specified period of time, but any such plan must
clarify whether all claims made against a physician constitute negligence. In addition, planners must consider an experience rating
system's applicability to areas of medicine that are prone to greater
numbers of claims; in other words, whether physicians in high risk
practice areas would be penalized unjustly by a merit system because they engage in high risk specialties and are subject to more
claims. Furthermore, the impact of long appeals, the effect of potential reversals of prior determinations of negligence, and whether
settlements would be admissions of liability for purposes of experience rating are issues which planners must consider. Undoubtedly
these practical considerations and others must be addressed by any
76. Id. at 565-66. "The acknowledgement of the significance of chance in accident involvement undercuts the claims for merit." Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 565-66.
78. Id. at 565.
79. Id. at 518. Austin discusses in depth the inherent dichotomy of insurance classification involving the opposing interests of individualism and intragroup unity or "solidarity" as
she refers to it. Id. at 548-80.
80. S. Wolfe, H. Bergman & G. Silver, supra note 3, at 4; cf.Kern, 4 Single Lawsuit
Could Cost You Your License, MED.ECON., Jan. 5, 1987, at 58 (describes a recent crackdown
among state medical review boards which has resulted in overcompensation for past laxity).

1987]

EXPERIENCE RATING AND MALPRACTICE

proposal which purports to invoke experience rating in the area of
medical malpractice insurance.
IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

While experience rating has not generally been implemented by
medical malpractice insurers,"1 it has recently been the subject of
insurance regulation and legislation at the state level. On June 12,
1986, the Insurance Department of the State of New York promulgated Regulation No. 12482 entitled "Physicians and Surgeons Professional Insurance Merit Rating Plan."8 3 In Massachusetts, the
state legislature has authorized the Commissioner of Insurance to
establish a scheme of credits and surcharges based on claims experience for those physicians insured by the Massachusetts Joint Underwriting Association.8 4 While both projects are in their infancy,
the New York version is at a slightly more advanced stage in its
development, having been finally promulgated six months before
the Massachusetts plan, which has yet to be actually implemented.
It is these efforts at merit rating which will provide the vehicle for
analyzing the effects of incorporating this concept into a comprehensive package of medical malpractice reforms.
A.

The New York Plan(s)

Despite 1985 legislation to curb rapidly rising malpractice premiums, New York carriers continued to seek substantial rate
hikes.8 5 While the insurance industry in some states is kept somewhat in check by a competitive market, 6 in New York, insurance
continues to be significantly regulated by the state.8 7 In an effort to
inject an element of accuracy 8 into the very difficult process of setting rates for medical malpractice insurance, the state adopted a
81. Rolph, Some StatisticalEvidence on MeritRating in MedicalMalpracticeInsurance,
48 J.RISK & INS. 247, 247 (1981). According to a spokesperson for St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, a major carrier of malpractice coverage, "[tihe St. Paul has examined
so-called 'experience' rating..., and has elected not to adopt it. Our underwriters have
stated that, for our company, it would not work well with low-frequency, high-severity losses
as occur in medical liability, which may take a long time to settle." Letter from Patrick R.
Hirigoyen to Lori L. Darling (Jan. 5, 1987).
82. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 152 (1986).
83. Id.
84. 1986 Mass. Acts 351, § 36.
85. Even Reforms Can'tHold Down Some MalpracticePremiums,MED. ECON., June 23,

1986, at 13-14.
86. P. DANZON, supra note 1,at 95-96.

87. Id. at 97.
88. Title 11, § 152.1(a) (Preamble).
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novel plan of merit rating its physicians. The purpose of the plan,
as described in its Preamble, seems to be enhanced predictability of
premiums.8 9 By incorporating an individual physician's actual past
claims experience into the equation, it is suggested that predictions
about the future will be more precise. 90 After reworking its initial
proposal in response to criticism from the state medical society,9 1
the final version consists of "a system of rules for imposing rate
surcharges or credits, within the existing class and territory matrix,
based upon an individual's past history of claims or disciplinary actions."' 92 Therefore, the New York plan of experience rating does
not replace the currently prevailing scheme of classification based
on practice specialty and geographic region,9 3 but is an adjunct system of further tailoring premiums to the individual insured.
As indicated, the system is triggered by a "claim" or "disciplinary action" against a physician. A "claim" is defined as
written notice or demand upon the insured, including suit, filed
by a claimant or other person acting on behalf of the claimant,
and received by the insurer, that alleges injuries or damages sustained from an incident. A single incident may
94 result in no more
than one chargeable loss for each physician.
A "chargeable loss" refers to the amount of money paid out by the
insurer which is of sufficient value to justify an adjustment in a physician's premium. 95
[F]or claims closed prior to July 1, 1981, the sum of all indemnity payments on any one closed claim must be at least
$15,000; for claims closed or outstanding on or after July 1,
1981, the sum of all indemnity payments on any one closed or
outstanding claim must be at least $30,000.96
In addition to chargeable losses, surcharges are also assessed for
disciplinary actions against a physician. 97 Such actions include
those conducted by the licensing board, 98 as well as proceedings instituted by a hospital. 99 In order of increasing gravity, the plan ap89. Id.
90. Id. The enhanced capacity to make predictions about the future certainly promotes
a fundamental function of insurance rate making. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note
47, at 641-42.
91. This System Rates a Zero With Doctors, MED. EcON., Mar. 31, 1986, at 11-12.
92. Title 11, § 152.1(a).
93. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
94. Title 11, § 152.2(a).
95. Title 11, § 152.2(b).
96. Id.
97. Title 11, § 152.3(b).
98. Id. at § 152.3(b)(1).
99. Id. at § 152.3(b)(2).
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plies a surcharge for state imposed probation, suspension of one's
license to practice, or revocation of the same.' ° In terms of hospital proceedings, those which result in a restriction, suspension or
termination of hospital privileges based on "malpractice or incompetency 10 1 will prompt a surcharge.' 0 2
The actual procedure of rating physicians according to their experience under the New York plan involves a point system conceptually similar to those used by states to penalize drivers for traffic
violations. However, rather than losing one's license after a certain
number of points have been generated, the physician pays a higher
premium for malpractice coverage. The surcharge is a percentage
value of the physician's base rate as determined by his classification
and geographic region within the state.10 3 In general, a chargeable
loss gives rise to a point which in turn prompts a surcharge.' 4 The
base
more points accumulated, the greater the percentage of one's
10 5
premium:
higher
new,
a
formulate
to
added
is
which
rate
FIGURE

1.

EFFECT OF SURCHARGE POINTS ON PREMIUMS OF

PHYSICIANS OF VARYING CLASSIFICATIONS

Surcharge Points
[Physician Class
and Location:]
1-7 Downstate
8-14 Downstate
1-7 Upstate
8-14 Upstate

Source:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 or More

200%
10% 35%
80% 130%
200%
35% 70% 110% 150%
200%
35% 70% 110% 150%
200%
45% 85% 120% 160%
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,§ 152.3(c) (1986).
0%
0%
0%
5%

0%
10%
10%
15%

Disciplinary actions do not generate points, but rather, are treated
proceeding corresponding to an autoseparately, with each type of
06
matic percentage increase.'
The events which trigger the system are only relevant if they
100. Id. at § 152.3(b)(1). The specific surcharges assessed for these methods of state medical board disciplinary action are 50%, 75%, and 100%, respectively. Id.
101. Id. at § 152.3(b)(2).
102. Id. (Institutional or hospital discipline will result in a surcharge of 75% for suspension or restriction of privileges, and a 100% surcharge for the termination of privileges.).
103. Id. at § 152.3(c). For physicians with less than one year's experience, or for those
who only practice part-time, a special provision is provided which allows for a reduction in
this base rate. Id. at § 152.3(d).
104. Title 11, § 152.3(c).
105. See id.
106. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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occur within the specified evaluation term.10 7 For chargeable
losses, the term extends back ten years from the date the insurance
contract became effective. 1" 8 Therefore, any chargeable loss payments made during this assessment period are relevant for purposes
of experience rating. 0 9 For disciplinary proceedings, the review
spans the five years prior to the date the insurance contract became
effective. 1 0 Physicians who have practiced medicine less than the
specified time periods 1 are evaluated on the number of years in
practice.' 12 Also, claims which span longer than thirteen years
from the incident to the settlement will not be used to assess
surcharges.1 13 Finally, the ultimate restriction on the process is
that the maximum allowable surcharge is 200% of the base rate,
14
which is added on to the physician's original premium.
To demonstrate, a class 3 physician who practices downstate,
and who has collected four surcharge points, as well as a restriction
of his hospital privileges, will be assessed a surcharge of 110%
(35% for the points based on his classification and location plus
75% for the restriction of privileges equaling a 110% surcharge
which will be added to his base premium).1 15 Therefore, if the physician has been paying $10,000 per year for malpractice coverage,
6
his new rate, after surcharges, will be $21,000 per year."
In addition to the basic procedure for calculating and assessing
surcharges, Regulation No. 124 directs that the physician receive
adequate notice' 17 of the surcharge and an opportunity to challenge
the results.1 18 This appeals process enables the physician to offer an
explanation for the events which lead to a surcharge.' 1 9 The plan
does not specify the details of the appellate procedure, but rather,
leaves the matter to the discretion of the insurer, subject to the ap107. Title 11, § 152.3(a).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. These "older" occurrences are excluded as bases for surcharge even if the insurer pays the claim during the evaluation term. Id. Presumably, this represents New York's
effort to confine the parameters of merit rating to a period of relatively recent history in a
physician's career.
114. Title 11, § 152.3(c).
115. Id. See supra p. 267 (chart) & note 102.
116. Id.
117. Title 11, § 152.3(h).
118. Id. at § 152.3(e).
119. Id.
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proval of the Insurance Department. 12 0 It is indicated that
"[s]urcharge 'points' shall be waived or reduced by insurers if circumstances indicate that they are not truly predictive of future
claims. ' 12 1 If it is ultimately determined that a physician is entitled
to a refund, then the refund shall include the surcharge paid for the
current policy term, as well as the two previous terms if appropriate
(i.e. where unwarranted surcharges had been paid by the physician
during the two prior terms)."12
In response to the New York Insurance Department Plan, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company of New York (MLMIC),
12 3
the largest physician-owned insurance company in the nation,
submitted its own merit rating proposal which was approved by the
Department for a one year trial basis.12 ' During this time, the company will collect data and document the efficacy of its proposal 12 5
for ultimate review by the state Superintendent of Insurance.' 2 6
The fundamental difference between the MLMIC plan and the
state's plan is the former's emphasis on individualized review of
physicians on a case-by-case basis.12 7 Review is triggered by a vari12 8
ety of occurrences. It will be automatic for disciplinary actions;
it may be prompted by claims experience1 29 and can also be initiated by "[a] physician member of the Company's Claim Review
Committee... based on his judgment that the methods of practice
of a policyholder have fallen below acceptable standards in one or
more Claims or Suits."1 3 ' If review is indicated, it will be performed by one of two panels,' 3 1 both of which include physician
members.'3 2 For Medical Society members, the Professional Medical Liability Insurance and Defense Board will review the physician
for a potential surcharge, whereas for non-members, the MLMIC
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at § 152.3(f).
123. Telephone interview with Shirley Connell, MLMIC Public Relations (Jan. 5, 1987)
[hereinafter Conell interview 1]. MLMIC insures approximately three-quarters of the physicians in New York State. Meyer, supra note 45, at 39.
124. Connell interview I, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. See MED. LIAB. MUTUAL INS. Co., PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS PROFESSIONAL

MERIT
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

RATING PLAN 4 (1986) [hereinafter MLMIC PLAN].
Connell interview I, supra note 123.
MLMIC PLAN, supra note 126, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Connell interview I, supra note 123.
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Claims Review Committee will perform an identical function.13 3
The purpose of these review committees is to evaluate the physician
and make appropriate recommendations to the insurer.1 34 This approach allows not only for the imposition of a surcharge (ranging
from 25% to 200% of the base premium), 135 but other remedial
measures as well, such as educational programs for the physicianinsured.136 MLMIC contends such flexibility and subjectivity are
essential to its plan, distinguishing it from the more mechanical
137
state version of experience rating.
B.

The Massachusetts Legislation and Debate

On January 1, 1987, Section 36 of Chapter 351,138 which was
enacted in July, 1986, as part of a diversified scheme of medical
malpractice reforms, 139 became effective. This Section enables the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance to institute a procedure,
whereby physicians insured by the Joint Underwriting Association"4° would be subject to credits and surcharges. 4 '
Said system shall provide for surcharges to be imposed on all
physicians insured by the association [JUA] whose claims in the
previous five years exceed in number the average number of
claims asserted against physicians in their specialty. Such
surcharges each year for a physician shall be calculated on an
actuarially sound basis to reflect the increased cost of defending
physicians with more claims asserted against them than the average in their specialty .... Said system shall further provide for

credits to be given to all physicians insured by the association
[JUA] who have not had a civil action commenced against them
for malpractice, error or mistake in the provision or failure to
provide medical or surgical services during their practice in the
133. MLMIC PLAN, supra note 126, at 3. The purpose of this dual-track review process
is to satisfy a preference of Medical Society members to be evaluated under their own peer
review system, and a similar preference by non-members to be reviewed by an unaffiliated
panel of their peers. Telephone interview with Shirley Connell, MLMIC Public Relations
(Jan. 9, 1987) [hereinafter Connell interview II].
134. MLMIC PLAN, supra note 126, at 3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Connell interview I, supra note 123.
138. 1986 Mass. Acts 351, § 36.
139. Telephone interview with Richard W. Moore, Executive Director of the Joint Underwriting Association of Massachusetts (Jan. 5, 1987) [hereinafter Moore interview I].
140. Of the 17,000 Massachusetts physicians, the Joint Underwriting Association provides coverage for 11,000. Rust, MDs in Massachusetts Troubled by New 'Cap. Liability
Costs to Rise for Some MassachusettsMDs, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1986, at 29; see supra
notes 18-19 and accompanying text for a general discussion of joint underwriting
associations.
141. 1986 Mass. Acts 351, § 36.
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commonwealth over a time period which the commissioner by
regulation shall determine.1 42
Although this legislation lays the groundwork for the creation
of an experience rating plan in Massachusetts, the actual procedure

to be used is still the subject of hearings and debate. 143 Currently,
the Massachusetts Medical Society is at the forefront of the debate

with suggestions for a plan that will meet the concerns of the medical community. 1"

Initially, it was suggested that as an arguable

matter of statutory interpretation, the legislation did not require the
implementation of merit rating, but rather created that option for

the Commissioner of Insurance.145 A number of issues arise from
the existing merit rating plans and current discussion in states such

as Massachusetts which are investigating the impact this insurance
reform might have on the medical malpractice dilemma. These issues are the focus of the following analysis.
V.

ANALYSIS

In order to effectively evaluate the merit rating alternative, the

practical and theoretical rationales for its implementation must first
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Telephone interview with Richard W. Moore, Executive Director of Joint Underwriting Association of Massachusetts (Nov. 5, 1987) [hereinafter Moore interview I]. Since
Massachusetts' new malpractice law became effective in January, 1987, the controversy has
focused on selecting a plan for implementation and determining the extent to which such a
plan must conform to the specifics of the enabling legislation. The divergent proposals on the
table are supplied by the Massachusetts Medical Society and the State Rating Bureau (SRB).
The Medical Society seeks a highly subjective approach referred to as a "doctors' judgment
plan" which imposes a surcharge after a two-tier peer review has determined that a patient
injury was the result of fault or actual malpractice. Under this system, the physician enjoys a
significant amount of due process via assessment by his peers and an opportunity for discussion prior to a surcharge. The SRB argues that such a plan does not comply with the guidelines provided in Section 36 of Chapter 351. Principally, the Medical Society proposal does
not incorporate a mechanism for ensuring that physicians who have more than the average
number of claims against them (as compared to other members of their specialty) are
surcharged regardless of fault.
The SRB plan is based on the premise that fault is of no consequence. The theory is that
the frequency of claims is the most significant criteria. The more claims against a physician,
the more time and money that must be expended by the insurer on his or her behalf. Therefore, this approach adopts a point system whereby an automatic mandatory surcharge is
generated by a claim which need not be a closed claim. It is suggested by proponents of this
plan that lawsuits or claims correlate with the likelihood of subsequent claims and are therefore justifiably surchargable events. As of the writing of this Note more hearings are planned
to reconcile the issues of experience rating of physicians in Massachusetts. Id.
144. Id. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
145. Moore interview I, supra note 139. At present, Massachusetts is committed to the
adoption of some form of merit rating, the specifics of which have yet to be finalized. Moore
interview II, supra note 143.
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be understood. From the perspective of the insured, experience rating is a means of individualizing the rate setting process. 146 If the
inference that there is some logical correlation between an insured's
past and future claims experience is justified,147 then merit rating
may be instituted in order to improve accuracy and predictability.-'4 8 This underlying correlation between past and future experience is, however, debatable.149 Danzon disputes suggestions that
malpractice is random, as are the claims filed and the decisions rendered by the courts.150 If these notions of malpractice as haphazard
events were to be accepted, merit rating would seemingly not be
justified. If claims are random, then past experience would have no
actuarial bearing on the likelihood of future problems. 151 However,
proponents have indicated that based on the available data, there is
in fact a correlation.152 Therefore, it may be argued that merit rating, for purposes of improving accuracy and predictability of premiums, is a sensible alternative.
Perhaps more significant justifications for experience rating involve the fundamental tort concepts of "punishment" and "deterrence."' 153 "Punishment" may be a harsh misnomer for what really
is a rationale derived from equitable principles.' 5 4 In other words,
fairness dictates that physicians who are negligent should pay more
than those who are not."' Physicians with good records should not
be penalized by having to continually finance the losses of those
with poor claims experience. 156 Merit rating can be viewed as a
supplement to a currently inefficient and ineffective mechanism of
146. See Schwartz & Komesar, supranote 70, at 1287; cf.Rolph, supranote 81, at 255-56
(individualization of premiums may also be desirable from the insurer'sperspective).
147. Rolph, supra note 81, at 259.
148. See id. at 256-57.
149. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
150. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 130; see also Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at
1287; Rolph, supra note 81, at 259; C. Phelps, Experience Rating in Medical Malpractice
Insurance 5 (June 1978) (unpublished manuscript issued by The Rand Corporation in which
statistical justification for experience rating is proffered).
151. But see sources cited supra note 150.
152. See sources cited supra note 150.
153. Schwartz & Komesar, supranote 70, at 1282-83, 1287, 1289; P. DANZON, supra note
1, at 86-87 (this notion of "deterrence" is a recurring foundation of analysis used by the
author to justify and/or discredit a variety of potential malpractice reforms including experience rating); see also Austin, supra note 46, at 567 (discussion of punishment and deterrence
in terms of merit rating automobile insurance).
154. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 250, n. 5.
155. See id.
156. Id. ("experience-rated premiums have appeal on grounds of equity: without experience rating, good risks effectively subsidize bad risks"); S. Wolfe, H. Bergman & G. Silver,
supra note 3, at iii, 4 (urging the adoption of experience-rated premiums so that good doctors
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'
physician discipline. 57
Since many states have failed to deal cogently with the alleged source of the medical malpractice crisis-the
negligent practitioner-perhaps a system of merit rating will
achieve the desired result by surcharging the incompetent physicians out of practice. 5' 8
It is certainly an acceptable function of the insurance industry to
promote loss avoidance. 59 Under merit rating, the insured can be
encouraged to prevent losses since he/she is rewarded by lower pre-

miums.'5° It is conceivable that merit rating restores the deterrent
effect of the tort liability system that is diminished, if not destroyed,
by liability insurance. 16 1 Theoretically, malpractice insurance

shields the physician from the financial impositions of the tort system.16 2 However, this argument may only be significant if the
other, perhaps more secondary, penalties associated with being sued
for medical malpractice are inconsequential. 6 3 The personal,

reputational and career ramifications of a lawsuit would arguably
have as powerful an effect on medical malpractice avoidance, as

would the imposition of financial sanctions.'" It seems that few
physicians (or their employers) are ambivalent about the threat of a
lawsuit even when the bulk of the monetary sanctions are paid by
the insurer. A claim of malpractice reflects negatively on a physician's skill and reputation which are important tools of his or her
will stop subsidizing the few doctors with poor performance records); cf. Abraham, supra
note 46, at 430.
157. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
158. S. Wolfe, H. Bergman & G. Silver, supra note 3, at i-iii, 1, 4, 5 (insufficient state
discipline of practitioners has created the medical malpractice crisis); C. Phelps, supra note
150, at 1; Curbing the Cost ofMedicalMalpracticeInsurance(WCBV-TV Boston, Channel 5,
May 1, 1985) (transcript of editorial available from the Massachusetts Legislature, Committee on Insurance, Boston, Massachusetts)("Insurance companies should charge rates which
reflect a doctor's track record. Higher rates for more claims paid works for drivers; why not
try it for physicians as well? The high cost of medical malpractice insurance is a problem.
But the legislature should treat the cause and not the symptoms.").
159. R. MEHR & E. CAmMACK, supra note 47, at 645.
160. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 122 (Reductions in an insured's premiums commensurate with the insured's expenses in providing himself a lower risk of loss protect the
incentives to invest in loss-reduction measures).
161. Id. at 5, 86-87, 130; Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at 1282, 1287, 1289 (malpractice insurance interferes with the deterrent function of the tort system unless premiums
are experience-rated).
162. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 5, 86, 130; Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of
Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
173, 176 (1986); Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at 1287 (liability insurance insulates
defendants from the economic costs of liability designed to constrain risk-creating activity).
163. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at 1287-88; cf. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at
129 (places greater emphasis on the impact of these intangibles).
164. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 129; Robinson, supra note 162, at 176-77.
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trade. Perhaps even more devastating than the harm to one's good
name is the impact of malpractice on a physician's potential for career advancement. Certainly, malpractice claims against a staff
physician are not taken lightly by a hospital employer and the physician's supervisors (nor should they be). A physician could be refused promotion or perhaps lose institutional practice privileges.
Therefore, the economic disincentive to malpractice created by the
threat of a lawsuit still exists despite the protection afforded by insurance because the physician's livelihood may be at stake.
Further insight into the deterrent rationale may be achieved by
a comparison to automobile insurance which uses merit rating, at
least in part, for this purpose.165 While deterrence may be a reasonable pursuit for both medical malpractice and automobile insurers,
the ramifications may differ. The individual driver who is subject to
merit rating of premiums will theoretically be motivated to avoid
accidents, and the associated insurance rate hikes. 16 6 Even if this
motivation holds true for physicians (which arguably it does not),
the implications for third parties differ, and may not be equally positive. When the driver modifies his behavior to avoid losses, there is
little concern that one can be too careful on the road. On the other
hand, a physician's effort to avoid malpractice and resulting
surcharges may encourage overly cautious or "defensive medicine"
and adversely affect patients. 1 67 If a physician approaches a seriously ill patient with such caution that it borders on trepidation,
neither the patient, nor the practice of medicine will benefit. Advances in medicine require that some risks be taken. If merit rating
is to be successfully applied to medical malpractice as a means of
modifying the behavior of those who take unacceptable risks with
patients, care must be taken so as not to also deter those physicians
165. Mass. Auto. Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 384
Mass. 333, 424 N.E.2d 1127 (1981). "The [insurance] industry challenges the Commissioner's finding that the deterrent effect of the merit rating program will reduce the frequency
of property damage and collision claims.... [However,] there was reasonable support in the
record for the Commissioner's decision to accept [this] approach .. " Id.at 338-39, 424
N.E.2d at 1130-31; see also Mass. Auto. Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 Mass. 592, 600-01, 411 N.E.2d 762, 767 (1980) (acknowledges deterrence
rationale of merit rating).
166. See cases cited supra note 165.
167. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at 1286, 1289; see SOCIOECONOMIC MONITORING SYSTEM, AMA CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, SMS REPORT, RECENT
TRENDS IN MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter SMS REPORT]
(provides data supporting claims of defensive practice); see also Texas Liability Survey Shows
PhysiciansLimiting Practices,Adding Tests and Procedures,AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 9, 1987,
at 12 (Texas study reveals procedures added to avoid lawsuits); but see Robinson, supra note
162, at 176-78. "[E]vidence of defensive medicine is notoriously unreliable." Id. at 177.
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who take risks which may cure patients and advance medical
knowledge.16 8 Other values must not be sacrificed in order that deterrence be enhanced. The potential for defensive medicine not only
creates problems for the individual patient whose care might be
compromised, 169 but may also result in broader ramifications for
health care delivery.
For example, while the incompetent physician may be justifiably
ousted from practice by an experience rating which makes insurance unaffordable, many good physicians may also elect to leave
practice.170 The high-risk specialties and litigious regions of the
country may experience a flight of physicians and eventual
shortages.17 1 There will be little incentive for these physicians to
practice in states like New York and Massachusetts which impose

malpractice surcharges when those physicians can practice elsewhere without these burdens. 7 2 However, physician flight is not
an unavoidable result if the merit rating system provides an incentive for competent physicians to remain by offering them lower base
premiums (i.e. pre-surcharge rates) than those their collegues are
forced to pay under non-experience rated plans in other states. If
an exodus of physicians does occur, it is arguable that the negligent
practitioners will leave in the greatest numbers since they stand to
lose the most by a system of surcharges. Therefore, from the perspective of states which elect to impose experience rating, this "exodus" may be perceived as a significant, albeit secondary, advantage

of such an approach. Even if physicians do not leave, they may
modify their behavior by refusing to accept patients with certain
high risk diagnoses.' 7 3 Finally, the monetary costs generated by de168. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. Physicians in the high risk subspecialties will likely feel most vulnerable under a system of experience rating. Even if competent and cautious, those doctors who care for patients necessitating innovative medical
treatment will presumably be sued more often. However, proponents of experience rating
may argue that these physicians will not be penalized. In effect, the "best" doctors in a high
risk classification group will enjoy a break in their premiums for the first time.
169. See SMS REPORT, supra note 167. "'[Negative defensive medicine,' occurs when a
physician avoids certain procedures because legal risks might arise from resulting complications." Id.
170. Rosenbloom & Stone, Social Aspects of the Rate Structure of Medical Malpractice
Insurance, J. RISK & INS. 53, 59-60 (1978).
171. Id. at 60; but see ABA COMM., supra note 1, at 33 (shortage allegations
unwarranted).
172. See Rosenbloom & Stone, supra note 170, at 59-60; but see ABA COMM., supra note
1, at 33. It may be arguable in the alternative that a redistribution of physicians prompted by
surcharge avoidance may be a positive ramification of merit rating.
173. Rosenbloom & Stone, supra note 170, at 59; See also P. DANZON, supra note 1, at
130-31; Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 70, at 1289.
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fensive medicine are well documented, as is the awareness that these
costs will be passed on to patients. 174 Therefore, a merit rating plan
which acknowledges that some risks are acceptable, and that a lawsuit or "closed claim" does175not always reflect surchargeable incompetence, must be pursued.
The optimal system requires some form of subjectivity as is incorporated into the MLMIC Plan, rather than plugging cold data
into an unyielding equation of credits and debits. 17 6 As urged by
some members of the medical community, it would seem that physicians themselves must actively participate in the subjective review
process if experience rating is to succeed. 177 Any plan which purports to affect a group as powerful as the medical community would
be wise to incorporate their involvement or confront vehement
resistance. According to Kenneth A. Heisler, M.D. of the Massachusetts Medical Society in testimony before the Massachusetts
Joint Committee on Insurance,
[s]uccessful experience rating and risk management programs
necessarily involve professional medical judgments, rather than
arbitrary actions based on statistics. The Commissioner of Insurance has great expertise in regulating insurance companies, but
he is not involved in regulating the practice of medicine....
Active, effective support is unlikely to result if the programs are
imposed from outside the medical profession ....178
Employing a peer review system where physicians evaluate the
claims experience of fellow practitioners should temper some of the
concerns associated with rigid variables such as "closed claims" and
"chargeable losses."' 7 9 In other words, physician participation
avoids burdening practitioners with unwarranted surcharges.1 80
Therefore, problems with deciding what constitutes "negligence"
for purposes of assessing surcharges might be ameliorated. 8"
The risk that physicians will be unable to police themselves, as
has frequently been the case with medical review boards, may not
174. Rosenbloom & Stone, supra note 170, at 60; see also P. DANZON, supra note 1, at
147; Robinson, supra note 162, at 178.
175. Connell interview II, supra note 133; see also Kern, supra note 80, at 60.
176. Connell interview I, supra note 123; see also P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 129.
177. Hearing,supra note 34 (testimony of Kenneth A. Heisler, M.D. before the Massachusetts Insurance Commission).
178. Id.
179. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 134-35.
180. Connell interview II, supra note 133; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 129, 251 n.12.
181. Connell interview I, supra note 123; P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 251 n.12. For
example, when a case is settled by the insurer without a trial, or reversed on appeal, whether
a surcharge is imposed would be a matter for deliberation by the review committee. Connell
interview II, supra note 133.
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be a problem if the insurance company is a physician-owned mutual
or employs physician specialists for the purpose of experience rating
review."8 2 The reviewing physicians' financial stake in the outcome
(as a representative of the insurer)
may balance the professional bias
3
8
he/she is likely to have.1

While the subjective component built into the merit rating process avoids the unfairness associated with a rigid approach to merit
rating, it may also create a significant bias. The subjective review
which determines whether to attach a surcharge or not would in
essence be performed by the insurer. Arguably, this may render the
review process less than impartial since the insurer obviously seeks
to benefit if a surcharge is imposed.18 4 A similar analysis reveals
what is perhaps the most significant potential problem; insurer conflict of interest. It is conceivable that insurers will be increasingly
motivated to settle rather than defend against frivolous claims 8 5 or
smaller claims they could likely win in litigation. It is clear that in
some cases the insurer will be encouraged to recoup at least some of
its costs by surcharging the physician rather than face the costs of
litigating a physician's potentially winning case. Thus, it may be
very difficult for the insurer to safeguard both the interests of the
physician-insured and its own economic interests. The potential for
abuse may also be great based on the power granted the insurer
with a given scheme of merit rating.
CONCLUSION

The problem of soaring medical malpractice premiums has been
addressed with a variety of proposed solutions. The most pervasive
response to the malpractice crisis has been in the realm of state tort
law reforms which have seemingly failed to rectify the insurance
component of the malpractice dilemma. Insurers continue to abandon the medical malpractice line of coverage and rates continue to
escalate.
A novel approach to the problem, experience rating of physicians, adapts a familiar form of insurance rate determination to an
182. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text; see P. DANZON, supranote 1, at 12829, 134-35.
183. See generally P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 134-35 (advocates review by medical
society members).
184. The proposed plans under consideration in Massachusetts are "revenue neutral." In
other words, surcharges are designed to cover costs, not to extract a profit at the insured's
expense. Moore interview II, supra note 143.
185. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 135.
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area of insurance which, as a rule, has not used this technique. This
approach provides a partial solution by enabling insurers to
surcharge those physicians who are burdening both the system and
their collegues because of costly malpractice claims. Two of the
states which are trying this approach are New York and
Massachusetts.
The state of New York plan mechanically imposes surcharges
for "claims" and "disciplinary actions." The plan is criticized because physicians have no input in the decision-making process. The
MLMIC approach addresses this concern by incorporating physician participation into the process of determining which claims and
lawsuits reflect surchargeable incompetence. Unlike the state's
plan, the imposition of a surcharge is not a knee jerk response to a
claim. Injecting this subjective component into the system furthers
two important objectives. First, physicians pay a surcharge only
when it is fair that they do so. Second, the medical community is
likely to support a rating system that allocates a degree of control
over the surcharge determination process to physicians. Although
the future of experience rating plans is uncertain, the subjectivity
which the MLMIC plan advocates may influence which plan, if
either, will prove to be the plan of choice.
LORI L. DARLING

